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Abstract
The existence of a beauty premium in the labor market and the male-
female wage gap suggests that appearance can matter in the real world. We
explore beauty and gender in a public goods experiment and find similar
eﬀects. We find a beauty premium, even though beautiful people contribute,
on average, no more or less than others. The beauty premium, however,
disappears when we provide information on individual contributions, and
becomes a beauty penalty. Players seem to expect beautiful people to be
more cooperative. Relative to these expectations, they appear more selfish,
which in turn results in less cooperation by others. These appear to be
clear examples of stereotyping. We also find a substantial benefit to being
male, especially with information. This is primarily due to men being better
“leaders.” Men tend to make large contributions, and people follow their
example and give more in later rounds.
∗We are grateful to Terence Burnham, Marco Castillo, Rachel Croson, Daniel Hamermesh,
and Bart Lipman for helpful comments. We also thank the National Science Foundation for
financial support.
1. Introduction
It is well known from labor market studies that beauty and gender can have
big eﬀects on earnings. Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) have shown a significant
premium to beauty, with attractive people earning more money than unattractive
people. There is also a significant and persistent male-female wage gap. Even
when controlling for age and experience, men earn about 25% more than women
(O’Neill, 2003, 1998). While some of these diﬀerences can be attributed to labor
market factors, much of the beauty premium and wage gap remains unexplained.
With labor market studies as inspiration, we look at the returns to beauty
and gender in an economic laboratory experiment where there are benefits to
group cooperation. Typically economic experiments take great pains to shield
the identities of subjects from each other, and as such have nothing to say about
how appearances may aﬀect earnings.1 Instead, we reveal the identities of players
to one another by showing their digital photos in the experiment. We find that
beauty and gender have significant and sometimes unexpected aﬀects on earnings.
Furthermore, the behaviors and apparent stereotyping we find may provide some
clues into why gender and beauty are so important in the labor market.
The experimental setting we consider is a repeated linear public goods game.
While not a direct test of the beauty premium or the wage-gap found in the
labor market, a public goods game is nonetheless an interesting institution for
exploring how such wage diﬀerences can emerge in an employment setting. People
1An important exception to this is research by Mobius and Rosenblat (2003) who use a labor
market experiment to decompose the beauty premium. In their experiment, an employer receives
a precise measure of a worker’s productivity from a practice round and decides a wage to pay the
worker. The interaction between the employer and worker is one shot, so the employer cannot
verify if a beautiful worker was as productive as originally thought.
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often work in teams where shirking cannot always be perfectly monitored. This
allows for stereotyping to color evaluations of and reactions to both free riding and
generosity, and to aﬀect the productivity of the team. A repeated public goods
game oﬀers a setting where stereotyping is possible (in groups of more than two)
and people have an opportunity to see if their expectations of behavior mesh with
actual behavior. When eﬀort is observable, certain people can “set the tone” for
the work group. Gender and beauty may aﬀect which people in the group may be
emulated by others, how much retribution people take against shirkers and how
much cooperation is used to reward generosity. In the end, the beauty and gender
of the individuals in the group will aﬀect the cooperation and success of the group
as a whole, and the earnings of its individual members.
In our experiment we show each player the digital photos of all other members
of their group each round. We have two conditions, one in which only total group
contributions are revealed, and another in which information on each player’s
contribution is revealed.
Our experiments find evidence for a beauty premium. This premium, however,
disappears once people know exactly what each group member contributed to the
public good. When only the total group contribution is observable, attractive men
and women make more money than unattractive men and women, even though
they are no more or less cooperative, on average, than unattractive people. When
individual contributions are observable, the reward to being beautiful disappears.
People seem to expect beautiful people to be more cooperative than others, and
when their behavior does not meet expectations, people are less cooperative with
them. There is also a diﬀerence in payoﬀs for men and women, but not always
favoring men. Women make more money than men when only group contributions
2
are known. This can be attributed primarily to the stereotype that women are
more helpful. Men, however, do best when individual contributions to the group
are clearly identified. Men earn 15% more when individual contributions are
known, compared to when only group contributions are known. Interestingly,
women’s payoﬀs do not change. This eﬀect can be attributed entirely to men
being better “leaders.” They contribute their full endowment more often, and
others follow their good example by contributing more in later rounds.
With these results, we begin to see some of the underlying factors that could
generate both a beauty premium and a wage gap, especially in team work envi-
ronments. People give beautiful people the benefit of the doubt in groups and
cooperate more with them, thereby enhancing group welfare. Women earn more
than men when individual contributions to group output are unknown because
they are stereotyped overall to be more helpful. However, once individual con-
tributions are known with certainty, the beauty premium disappears and a male
premium replaces it. This appears to be due to people being more willing to fol-
low the lead of generous men. When a man’s generous contribution is observed,
it engenders more cooperation than a similar contribution by a woman. This ef-
fect is amplified when the proportion of men in the group is higher, suggesting a
kind of generosity-competition among men. As a result, men earn more money in
the experiment when individual contributions to group output are known. In our
data, the male premium is almost equal in size to the beauty premium.
Why are these results important? They illustrate how easily subtle sex and
beauty stereotypes can influence economic outcomes, and suggests that further
study on the role of stereotypes in economics could yield important insights.
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2. Background
In our experiment subjects see the digital photos of their partners on the computer
screen when they make their decisions. In half of our sessions we also tell subjects
what each member contributed in the prior round. There are three ways this
could have an eﬀect. Simply showing faces could matter, gender and beauty
could matter, and finally the information on amounts given could matter.
There is good reason to expect that simply seeing the faces of partners will
aﬀect play. Bohnet and Frey (1999a,b) find that visual identification increases
cooperation in one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma and Dictator games, and Burnham
(2003) reports that giving more than doubles in Dictator games when at least
one of the partners sees the other’s photograph. Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik,
and Wilson (2001) see slightly more cooperation when subjects are faced with
a photograph of smiling bargaining partners, and Eckel and Wilson (2003) find
subjects are more trusting when they see their partner. Solnick and Schweitzer
(1999) report a significant eﬀect of attractiveness on oﬀers received and responses
made in ultimatum bargaining games.
Gender also has been shown to have an important eﬀect on behavior and
payoﬀs. Eckel and Grossman (1998) find groups of women to be more generous
than groups of men in Dictator games, while Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) find
women more equalitarian than men in Dictator Games. Buchan, Croson, and
Solnick (2003) report that women are less trusting but more trustworthy than
men in an investment game. Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini (2003) find women
to be more productive in competitive-pay environments when in same-sex groups,
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rather than mixed-sex groups.2
There is also experimental evidence from the sociology and psychology liter-
ature that beauty carries a premium. In Prisoner’s Dilemma games, people are
more cooperative with attractive partners (Mulford, Orbell, Shatto, and Stockard,
1998). Indeed, in a comprehensive review of the literature on beauty, Langlois,
Klakanis, Rubenstein, Larson, Hallam and Smoot (2000) find that attractive peo-
ple are not only judged and treated more favorably but they also behave diﬀerently.
Finally, simply knowing what each other player has chosen can also have an
impact. For instance, Andreoni and Petrie (2004) find that cooperation is highest
when actions can be linked to the actor. But, information may also help adjust
judgements. Social expectancy theory predicts that if people have diﬀerent expec-
tations of how, for instance, attractive and unattractive others will behave, then
they may have totally diﬀerent reactions to the same observed behavior depend-
ing on which person they are facing (Darley and Fazio, 1980; Zebrowitz, 1997).
Furthermore, psychologists suggest that people come to the table with prejudices
and stereotypes. However, after meeting someone and gaining more information,
these prejudices are often revised or washed away (Devine, 1989). Related to
this are issues of similarity and familiarity. People tend to favor those similar to
themselves (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001), and working with famil-
iar others can reduce transaction costs, as familiarity can enhance trust (Glaeser,
Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter, 2000).
This suggests that people may behave diﬀerently with others when they know
their decisions, rather than just their appearance, and that people may want to
emulate the choices of “similar” others. Also, people can use their choices to signal
2See Eckel and Grossman (2000) for a review of gender diﬀerences in laboratory experiments.
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information to others in order to establish a link later (such as getting a date).
Identification may not only serve to help form impressions before actions, but peo-
ple may also use identification as a guideline for judging actions and formulating
a response.
3. Methodology
Our experiments use a linear public goods game. The game is repeated, and
subjects make their decisions on a computer. Each session has 20 subjects, and
they are randomly divided into 4 groups of 5 subjects. In each round a subject is
endowed with 20 tokens that could be invested in a private good or a public good.
The private good pays $0.02 per token invested by the individual, and the public
good pays $0.01 per token invested by the entire group. Therefore, the marginal
return to investing in the public good is 0.5. Each subject is paid based on his
investment in the private good and the total group investment in the public good.
Subjects play with the same group of 5 people for 8 rounds, then are randomly
re-matched to new groups for another 8 rounds, until they play with five diﬀerent
groups, each for 8 rounds. So, subjects play 40 rounds in total in each session.3
A digital photograph is taken of each subject at the beginning of the exper-
imental session. At the end of each round, the total amount contributed to the
public good by all group members is reported. There are two treatments: No
Information and Information.4 In the Information treatment, both the photo and
the contribution of that group member from the previous round are displayed.
3Very few subjects knew other subjects in the experiment (87% of the subjects had “never
met” any other subject in the experiment).
4Note that, in Andreoni and Petrie (2004), the No Information treatment is called “Photos”
and the Information treatment is called “Information-and-Photos.”
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The contribution is listed below each photo, and the photos are rearranged each
round with the highest contributor on the left and the lowest on the right. In the
No Information treatment, only the photos of each group member are displayed
on the screen and no information on individual actions is given.
All treatments were conducted twice. This gives us 80 subjects in total. Sub-
jects were recruited from economics and business classes at the University of Wis-
consin - Madison. There were 39 female subjects and 41 male subjects in total,
ranging in age from 18-29 years (mean 20.3 years old). Each experimental ses-
sion took about an hour and a half, and the average subject payment was $26.46
(standard deviation $3.13).
Subsequently, people not involved in the experiments rated each photo as to
the person’s physical attractiveness or how helpful looking he/she appears. In
total, the raters saw 140 photographs. These photos were of the 80 subjects in
the No Information and Information treatments and 60 other photos of subjects
in two other public goods game treatments.5 These other treatments were not
used here as they do not allow a clear test of beauty and gender eﬀects.
We chose to have the raters view the 80 subjects randomly mixed among
the other 60 photos to get a “global” measure of physical attractiveness and
helpfulness. We want to know if a subject is considered physically attractive
among his or her peers, not only among the subjects in the session. Drawing
on this broader distribution of 140 photographs gives us more information and
confidence in our classification and subsequent results.
5The photos of the 60 other subjects come from the same cohort as the 80 subjects in the No
Information and Information treatments. They were recruited at the same time as the 80 other
subjects from economics and business school classes at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Of the 60 subjects, 33 are male and 27 are female, ranging in age from 18-28 years (mean: 20.1
years old).
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Each rater rates all 140 photographs along one dimension, physical attractive-
ness or helpfulness. The raters view the photos on the computer in a random
order, assign a rating, and have the ability to move back to previously rated pho-
tos to change or check ratings. Raters know they can do this before they begin
rating. The raters use a 9-point scale, with 1 indicating “not at all” and 9 indicat-
ing “very much so.” Raters are told to think of the number 5 as average. There
are 15 raters in total. Four women and four men rated each photo in terms of
physical attractiveness, and four women and three men rated each photo in terms
of helpfulness. The raters were all undergraduates of the University of Wisconsin-
Madison, with an average age of 20.7. The raters were paid a flat fee of $15 to
rate 140 photographs, and the rating task took 30-45 minutes to complete.
4. Beauty Classification
In this section we discuss our beauty classification methodology, the reliability
across those rating beauty, and explain how we define attractiveness.
First, we assume the raters use all 140 photos as a frame of reference. When
discussing consensus among raters, therefore, we consider the consensus for all 140
photos. Also, when defining attractiveness, we use all 140 photos as the entire
frame of reference.6
Turning to the consensus among raters, the inter-rater reliability for physical
attractiveness is 0.86, and for helpfulness it is 0.82.7 These reliability measures
6Note that similar, yet not as strong, results hold if we define the frame of reference to be
only the 80 photos of the subjects in the Information and No Information treatments. So, it
appears that the frame of reference is important in defining who is attractive. We opt to base
the analysis of this paper on the larger frame of reference because it improves the accuracy and
predictive power of our ratings.
7We use the Cronbach coeﬃcient alpha for standardized variables (Cortina, 1993; SAS Insti-
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compare well with previous research on attractiveness and suggest a strong con-
sensus among raters. Our reliability measures also compare well with previous
research on attractiveness, where the range of reliability measures is between 0.85
and 0.95 (Langlois et al., 2000).8
There is some variability in the spread and average rating any given rater
gave. Some raters use the entire range from 1 to 9, but others truncate the range
between 3 and 8. Therefore, each rater’s ratings of all photos are standardized by
the rater’s mean and standard deviation to mean zero and standard deviation of
one. Then, for each subject, we average the standardized ratings across all raters
to give a value of physical attractiveness and helpfulness for each subject. These
averaged standardized ratings are used throughout the paper.
Overall, women are rated significantly higher in attractiveness than men.
Women receive an average standardized rating of 0.29 and men -0.26. The same
holds for helpfulness. Women were rated, on average, at 0.25 and men at -0.22.
That is, women are considered more attractive and more helpful-looking than
men.
There are, obviously, many ways of defining an attractive person. Because we
wish to examine the eﬀects of beauty on earnings and women are disproportion-
ately rated more attractive than men, we take into consideration both gender and
beauty rating in our classification. Of the 140 subjects, 66 are women and 74 are
tute Inc., 1988). This measures the correlation between all raters and adjusts for rater specific
mean and variance. While this rating raises automatically as the number of raters increases
(we thank Daniel Hamermesh for pointing this out), we report it in order to compare with
other studies using attractiveness ratings. Using an alternative measure of reliability, an intra-
class correlation coeﬃcent (two-way random eﬀects model), we find similar results. The ICC
coeﬃcient is 0.7506.
8Langlois et al. (2000) report an acceptable range of reliability measures is between 0.85 and
0.95. The fact that measures fall on the lower end of this range and reflect our 9—point scale.
Most scales were 5-point or 7-point.
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men. For women, we took the top quartile of the distribution of attractiveness
ratings for these 66 women and classified them as attractive. We did the same for
the men. Then, we took the bottom quartile of the distribution of attractiveness
ratings for the 66 women and classified them as unattractive. We did the same
for men. Anyone in the middle of the distribution was classified as middle attrac-
tive. For robustness, we repeated our analysis with both more and less exclusive
definitions, with nearly identical results.9 This classification of subjects is also
within the range used by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), where between 25%-34%
of their samples were classified as above average or higher in attractiveness.10
Table 1
Distribution of Attractiveness
Women Men
Attractive 8 8
Middle 19 25
Unattractive 12 8
Total 39 41
The distribution for the 80 subjects considered here is shown in Table 1.11
By definition, there are roughly an equal number of men and women classified as
attractive.12
9We also classified subjects as attractive and unattractive by using the 20th-percentile and
the 30th-percentile. Results using the 20th-percentile cut-oﬀ are strikingly similar to those
using the quartile cut-oﬀ. Results using the 30th-percentile cut-oﬀ follow similar trends to those
using the quartile cut-oﬀ, however some results that are statistically significant with the quartile
cut-oﬀ are not with the 30th-percentile cut-oﬀ.
10Note that Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) did not use the same range of their data to classify
people as unattractive. Between 7%-17% of their samples were classified as below average or
lower in attractiveness.
11When we did not condition on gender, the distribution of attractive, middle attractive and
unattractive subjects across men and women was skewed. 14 women and only 3 men were
classified as attractive, and 14 men and only 4 women were classified as unattractive.
12The distributions of attractiveness are similar across the 140 subjects and the sample of 80
subjects. The hypothesis of independence across the two distributions cannot be rejected by a
Chi-Square test (p-value=0.761).
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5. Results
We first discuss the beauty premium, then gender diﬀerences in payoﬀs, and finally
the interaction of beauty and gender.
5.1. Does Beauty Pay?
First consider the No Information treatment. The left-hand side of Table 2 shows
that there are positive returns to beauty. Attractive people make 9% more than
middle attractive people and 15% more than unattractive people. The returns to
beauty are similar to those found by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), where above-
average attractive people earned about 5% more than average-attractive people.
The diﬀerences across the three attractiveness categories are significant.13
Table 2
Average Payoﬀ
No Information Information
Attractive $27.49 $27.57
Middle $25.25 $27.37
Unattractive $23.88 $27.77
p-value∗ 0.0425 0.7865
∗Joint Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test for equality of payoﬀs across
the three categories.
While there is evidence for a beauty premium in the No Information treat-
ment, it disappears in the Information treatment. The right-hand side of Table
2 illustrates this. In the Information treatment, payoﬀs appear independent of
beauty.14
13In pair-wise tests using the Wilcoxon rank sum test, attractive people make significantly
more than middle attractive (p-value=0.0905) and unattractive people (p-value=0.0108). How-
ever, middle attractive people do not make significantly more than unattractive people.
14In pair-wise comparisons using a Wilcoxon rank sum test, payoﬀs are not significantly dif-
ferent between attractive, middle attractive, or unattractive people.
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We see that returns to beauty are significant, but only when performance
cannot be observed. Both attractive men and women earn more money. We
explore the returns to gender further in section 5.2. Next, we ask why the beauty
premium might exist.
5.1.1. Behavior of Attractive People
Why do attractive men and women make more money? Two possible explanations
are that they are either more selfish or that they engender more cooperation from
others. The first explanation is explored in Table 3. For the No Information treat-
ment, the left-hand side of the table shows that attractive people and unattractive
people are, on average, less selfish than middle attractive people. Both attrac-
tive and unattractive people contribute between 47-55% of their endowment to
the public good, but middle attractive people only contribute 31%. While the
average contribution of an attractive person is significantly diﬀerent than that of
a middle attractive person, there is no significant diﬀerence in contributions of
attractive and unattractive people.15
If higher earnings are due to more selfishness, then it makes sense that middle
attractive people make more money than unattractive people since they contribute
less on average. This also would imply that attractive people would make less
money than middle attractive people. But, attractive people make more. While
there is no significant diﬀerence between the average contribution of an attractive
and unattractive person, an attractive person makes $3.61 more than an unattrac-
tive person. Selfish behavior is not an explanation for why attractive people make
more money, but it may explain the higher payoﬀ for middle attractive people
15In pair-wise comparisons using a Wilcoxon rank sum test, the diﬀerence in the average
contribution of an attractive person and an unattractive person is insignificant (p-value=0.5966).
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relative to unattractive people.
Table 3
Average Percent Contributed per Round
No Information Information
Attractive 55.0 42.1
Middle 31.2 49.3
Unattractive 46.9 50.0
p-value∗ 0.0084 0.5872
∗Joint Kruskal-Wallis rank sum test for equality of contributions
across the three categories.
For the Information treatment, the right-hand side of Table 3 shows that
attractive people contribute less than middle attractive and unattractive people.
However, the diﬀerence in contributions is not significant, nor are their payoﬀs in
Table 2.16
We do not find evidence that the beauty premium observed in the No Informa-
tion treatment is due to more selfish behavior by attractive people. Indeed, there
are no clear trends in contribution behavior and payoﬀs. Attractive people are
no more cooperative than unattractive people, but they still make more money.
This suggest that the diﬀerence in payoﬀs may be due to how others respond to
beauty. We explore this next.
5.1.2. Favoritism and Beauty Stereotypes
Could the observed beauty premium be due to favoritism towards attractive peo-
ple? If favoritism exists, then we would expect people to react more cooperatively
with attractive people than with people who are not attractive. Table 4 explores
this hypothesis. We compare the average contribution of nonattractive people
16In pair-wise comparisons using a Wilcoxon rank sum test, there are no significant diﬀerences
in the average contribution of attractive, middle attractive, or unattractive people.
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(those who are classified as middle and unattractive) in groups with no attractive
people and in groups with at least one attractive person. We concentrate on the
contributions of nonattractive people because we want to isolate the eﬀects of
beauty in a group on the behavior of others.
Table 4
Average Percent Contributed by Nonattractive People
in groups of Attractive People, All Rounds
# of Attractive
people in group No Information Information All
0 29.8 53.8 42.2
1 or more∗ 41.4 44.8 43.0
p-value 0.0023 0.0234 0.7477
∗In the No Information treatment, there are 14 groups with one attractive person,
6 with two attractive people, 2 with three attractive people, and 2 with four
attractive people. In the Information condition, there are 11 groups with one
attractive person, 7 with two attractive people, and 5 with three attractive people.
Table 4 shows that the contributions of nonattractive people depend on the
beauty of the other groupmembers. In the No Information treatment, the presence
of beauty in the group does engender more cooperation. The average percent
contributed in groups with no attractive people is 29.8%, but in groups with at
least one attractive person, the average increases to 41.4%.17 This diﬀerence is
significant and suggests the presence of beauty may engender more cooperation.
In the Information treatment, however, it is the absence of beauty that engenders
more cooperation. The average contribution in groups with at least one attractive
person is 44.8%, but in groups with no attractive people, it increases to 53.8%.
This diﬀerence is also significant, but it contradicts favoritism.
17Similar results hold if we include the contributions of attractive people. In this case, con-
tributions increase to 46.2% in the No Information treatment and decrease to 44.8% in the
Information treatment. This suggests that it is not merely nonattractive people who are af-
fected by the presence of attactive people in the group.
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Why do nonattractive people reverse their behavior from one treatment to the
next? One hypothesis is rooted in beauty stereotypes and reciprocity. That is,
people are more cooperative with attractive people because they believe attractive
people are helpful. Langlois et al. (2000) found, in a comprehensive review of the
beauty literature, that attractive people are consistently judged and treated more
positively. We also find this in our ratings data. Thirty-eight percent of attractive
subjects are also judged helpful looking, 18% of middle attractive people are also
judged helpful looking, but only 5% of unattractive people are judged helpful
looking. This is remarkable because these ratings are by people who did not
observe the decisions of the individuals in the photos and they did not rate the
subjects in terms of attractiveness. This suggests that people independently expect
attractive people to be more cooperative.
While there may be reason to believe such a stereotype exists, it is a bit
tricky to tease apart because people may hold stereotypes but not act upon them.
However, Devine (1989) argues that if people hold stereotypes, once they meet
a stereotyped individual and gain more information, they revise or eliminate the
stereotype. That is, without information, they act upon the stereotype, but with
information, behavior changes. How behavior changes depends on how people
revise or react to behavior that does not coincide with the stereotype.
If people hold the stereotype that attractive people are cooperative and people
wish to reciprocate cooperation, then we should see changes in behavior in two
ways. First, without information, people should be more cooperative with attrac-
tive people. Evidence for this behavioral change can be found in Table 4. Without
information, we see that nonattractive people are more cooperative in groups with
attractive people than in groups with no attractive people, even though we know
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that attractive people contribute the same, on average, as unattractive people.
Moreover, there is higher cooperation in groups with attractive people in every
round of the 8-round sequence, with the diﬀerence increasing over the rounds. In
round one, the diﬀerence in cooperation is 10.4 percentage points, and in round
eight, it is 18.0 percentage points.
Second, with information, we should see diﬀerences in behavior in groups with
attractive people and in groups without attractive people because people can now
compare how the actions of attractive people diﬀer from their expectations. How
behavior changes depends on whether deviations from expectations are rewarded
or punished.18 In Table 4, we see that with information, nonattractive people
are more cooperative in groups with nonattractive people. They contribute 20%
more. This result suggests stereotyping and punishment of behavior that does
not meet expectations since there was no significant diﬀerence in contribution
levels of attractive, middle attractive, and unattractive people in the Information
treatment.
What is remarkable about this result is that if people base reciprocity solely
on met or unmet expectations on behavior, then there should be no diﬀerence in
Table 4. The presence of an attractive person in the group should not matter.
That it does suggests that people react diﬀerently to the same actions of attractive
and unattractive people.19
18Bosman and van Winden (2002) find that subjects that expected their partners to share
more of the pie than they actually did were more likely to punish in a power-to-take game.
19In the very first round of the experiment, before any experience is gained with attractive
people, there is no significant diﬀerence across treatments in the average contribution of nonat-
tractive people in groups with attractive people. This suggests that subjects start out with the
same beliefs over the actions of attractive people.
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In sum, it appears that people discriminate based on beauty stereotypes. At-
tractive men and women are given the benefit of the doubt when group members
do not see performance, even though they contribute amounts similar to unattrac-
tive men and women. Indeed, the presence of beauty engenders more mutual
cooperation, and this may explain the beauty premium. However, when group
members can evaluate performance, the presence of beauty engenders less cooper-
ation. People seem to expect attractive men and women to be more cooperative
than average. When they are not, others are less cooperative with them, and the
beauty premium disappears.
5.1.3. Gender Diﬀerences in Beauty Stereotypes
Does favoritism diﬀer by gender? In the No Information treatment, it does not.
Both nonattractive men and women are significantly more cooperative in groups
with attractive people than in groups with no attractive people.
In the Information treatment, only men significantly decrease their contribu-
tions in groups of attractive people compared to groups with no attractive people.
In groups with no attractive people, men contribute 59.9%, but this declines to
41.1% in groups with at least one attractive person. Women increase their contri-
butions, from 46.3% to 47.7%, but this is not significant.20 This may mean that
nonattractive men and women may hold diﬀerent beauty stereotypes. Or, they
may hold the same stereotype, but only men act upon it.
These results suggest that there are no gender diﬀerences in favoritism, but
there may be in beauty stereotypes. In the No Information treatment, both men
and women are more cooperative with an attractive person in the group. Men
20Strikingly similar results hold if attractive men and women are included in the average.
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and women, however, react diﬀerently to information and attractive people in the
group. In the Information treatment, the reduction in contributions in groups of
attractive people is driven by the actions of men.21
5.2. Does Gender Pay?
We now move the focus from beauty to gender. Overall, men and women make the
same amount of money. Table 5 shows that both men and women make around
$26.50 over both treatments. However, women make $1.67 more than men in
the No Information treatment, and men make $1.38 more than women in the
Information treatment. The former diﬀerence is significant at the 10% level, and
the latter is not.
Table 5
Average Payoﬀ
Women Men p-value*
Both Treatments $26.50 $26.41 0.9463
No Information $26.22 $24.55 0.0962
Information $26.80 $28.18 0.1162
p-value* 0.5273 0.0002
∗Pair-wise Wilcoxon test for equality of payoﬀs across the two
treatments/genders.
Within gender, women make about the same across treatments. They make
$26.22 in No Information and $26.80 in Information. By contrast, the payoﬀ for
men is 15% higher in the Information treatment compared to the No Information
treatment. This diﬀerence is significant.
21Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) also find that men are more apt to hold and act on stereotypes.
Using trust experiments, they find that men in Isreali society are more likely to act on ethnic
stereotypes than women.
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There is a gender diﬀerence, but that switches from favoring women to men
when actions are known. There are large benefits to information, but only men
reap them. Again, there are two possible explanations. Women could be more
selfish than men, or men may engender more cooperation with their performance
than women. We discuss these possibilities next.
5.2.1. Behavior of Men and Women
Are women more selfish than men? Table 6 shows that, on average, women are
no more or less cooperative than men–men give roughly 15% more than women,
but this is not significant. However, men play the extremes significantly more
than women.22 Men contribute zero tokens 27.7% of the time, but women do so
only 16.3% of the time. Women also contribute all of their tokens only 9.4% of
the time, compared to men who do so 22.1% of the time. Similar results hold for
each treatment separately.
Table 6
Average Contribution, Zero Tokens, and All Tokens
Both Treatments
Men Women P-value
Average Contribution (%) 46.7 40.7 0.1938
% of Times Zero Tokens 27.7 16.3 0.0594
% of Times All Tokens 22.1 9.4 0.0012
This suggests that the gender premium to women is not due solely to more
selfishness on their part. Women seem to be benefiting from a combination of their
slightly lower contributions and their beauty. While they are not significantly more
selfish, they are more beautiful, and returns to beauty are high. We return to the
22Men are found to have higher variance in behavior relative to women in other research. An-
dreoni and Vesterlund (2001) find that men are more likely to be completely selfish or completely
altruistic. Pinker (2002) finds higher variance in the IQ scores of men relative to women.
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interaction of beauty and gender in Section 5.3. First, we address the question of
why men do better in the Information treatment than women.
5.2.2. “Good Examples” and Sex Stereotypes
Are people more cooperative with men than with women? Table 7 reports the
results of linear regressions showing how the average individual contribution to
the group is aﬀected by the gender composition of the group.23 The regressions
include individual fixed eﬀects.24 Model 1 shows that, over both treatments, as
the number of men in the group increases,25 the average individual contribution
of group members increases as well.26 These eﬀects are significant. This suggests
that people cooperate more with men than with women, even though Table 6
showed that men give no more on average than women.
When we consider treatment eﬀects, Model 2 shows that, with information,
the cooperation eﬀect of more men in the group increases two fold.27 Without
information, the eﬀect is not significantly diﬀerent from zero. That is, people are
23The dependent variable is the average amount a subject contributed to a group over the 8
rounds he played with that group. That is, the average that individual i contributes to group
j is defined as gij =
P8
t=1 gijt/8. Each subject plays with 5 diﬀerent groups, so in total, there
are 400 observations for the 80 subjects.
24These are captured with identification dummy variables. Note that these variables also
capture the treatment eﬀects of information.
25This is the percent of men in the group other than the subject himself. So, for a group with
three men and two women, each man would have 50% of the group as men, and each woman
would have 75% of the group as men.
26The dependent variable, average contribution to the public good, is censored at zero and
20 since subjects are only endowed with 20 tokens in each round. Although the models in
Table 7 were run as OLS linear regressions, very similar results hold if the models are run as a
double-truncated Tobit.
27Across treatments, there is no significant diﬀerence in the distribution of the gender compo-
sition of groups. The p-value for a Fischer Exact test is 0.522. Thus, the significant treatment
eﬀects are not due to one treatment having more groups with more men than the other treat-
ment.
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more cooperative in groups with more men only when performance is observable.28
For example, the average individual contribution to a group where half of the
group, other than oneself, is comprised of men will be about 3 tokens higher in
the Information treatment than in the No Information treatment.
Table 7
OLS Regression Coeﬃcients
Dependent Variable: Average Contribution to the Group
Pooled Data
Model 1 Model 2
Constant 6.36 8.41
(0.0002) (0.0001)
% Men in group other than self 3.07 -0.36
(0.0011) (0.7970)
% Men in group other than self * Info 6.06
(0.0011)
Individual Fixed Eﬀects yes yes
R2 0.62 0.63
Note: p-values in parentheses, n = 400
Could this significant increase in cooperation with information be explained
by favoritism based on sex stereotypes? If people expect attractive people to be
more cooperative, could they also expect women to be more cooperative, especially
since they are rated higher in attractiveness? From our ratings data on helpfulness,
indeed, more people expect women to be helpful than men, but, perhaps more
importantly, more people expect men to be more unhelpful than women.29 Forty-
one percent of men are rated as unhelpful, but only 10% of women are rated as
such.
This would suggest that people are more cooperative as the number of men in
the group increases because they discover that men are not as unhelpful as they
28Note that this eﬀect also holds for both men and women separately.
29Twenty-five percent of women are rated in the upper quartile of helpfulness compared to
12% of men.
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expected. So, even though men give no more on average than women, men may
be able to engender more cooperation because they exceed expectations.
Perhaps a stronger explanation of men’s ability to engender cooperation may
come from the “good example” that they set. As noted earlier, men are more
likely than women to contribute nothing or contribute their full endowment, but
as the number of men in the group increases, the probability of contributing zero
declines. A Tobit regression on the average probability of contributing zero in a
group shows a significant decline in this probability as the percent of men in the
group increases.30 This holds for pooled data, for men only, and for women only.31
While the probability of contributing the “bad” extreme declines with the pres-
ence of more men, the probability of contributing the “good” extreme increases,
but only for men. Table 8 shows how the average probability that a man will
contribute the full endowment to the group changes as the percent of men in the
group increases.32 The results for women are similar, but insignificant. Model 1
shows that men are more likely to contribute all of their tokens as the percent of
men in the group increases, and Model 2 shows that, when performance is known,
men are almost twice as likely to contribute the full endowment.
30The dependent variable is the average probability that a subject contributed zero tokens
to a group over the 8 rounds he played with that group. That is, the average probability that
individual i contributes zero tokens to group j is defined as pij =
P8
t=1 I(1|gi = 0)ijt/8, where
I(·) is an indicator function that equals 1 when the contribution was 0 tokens. The coeﬃcient
on the variable “% men in group other than self” is, bβ = −0.24 (s.d. = 0.07).
31When performance is known, as in Model 2 in Table 8, the probability of free riding declines
even further, but the eﬀects are insignificant.
32The dependent variable is the average probability that a subject contributed his full
endowment to a group over the 8 rounds he played with that group. That is, the aver-
age probability that individual i contributes his full endowment to group j is defined as
pij =
P8
t=1 I(1|gi = 20)ijt/8, where I(·) is an indicator function that equals 1 when the contri-
bution was 20 tokens.
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Table 8
Tobit Regression Coeﬃcients
Dependent Variable: Average Probability of Contributing Full Endowment
Men Only
Model 1 Model 2
Constant -0.29 0.04
(0.1683) (0.8543)
% Men in group other than self 0.38 -0.15
(0.0221) (0.5533)
% Men in group other than self * Info 0.87
(0.0076)
Individual Fixed Eﬀects yes yes
Log-likelihood -87.20 -83.75
Note: p-values in parentheses, n=205
This suggests that the reason that men make more money when performance
is known is because they put on a better performance, especially in the presence
of other men. Moreover, their performance may engender more cooperation from
others.33 While men free ride more than women, they also set a “good example”
more than women. As the composition of the group changes from women to men,
both men and women free ride less, but men set the “good example” even more.
This significantly increases the contributions of others in the group, and men make
more money.
5.3. The Combined Eﬀects of Beauty and Gender
Do the eﬀects of beauty and gender hold when we control for them together? Table
9 shows the eﬀects of beauty and gender on individual payoﬀ in each group.34 The
33This result is consistent with Camerer, Ho, Chong, and Weigelt’s (2002) idea of “strategic
teaching.” A person, recognizing that others learn in a repeated game, would make choices
to maximize long-run payoﬀs. This would suggest that men set a good example to ensure
cooperation, and higher earnings, in the future.
34The dependent variable is the total payoﬀ a subject earned in a group over the 8 rounds he
played with that group. Each subject plays with 5 diﬀerent groups, so in total, there are 400
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regressions control for individual and group eﬀects.35
Table 9
OLS Regression Coeﬃcients
Dependent Variable: Total Individual Payoﬀ (sum across all 8 rounds) with a Group
Pooled Women Men
(n=400) (n=195) (n=205)
Constant 3.98 4.33 4.13
(0.31) (0.47) (0.36)
Attractive 0.58 0.62 0.22
(0.24) (0.33) (0.36)
Middle Attractive 0.44 0.22 0.58
(0.18) (0.27) (0.24)
# Attractive people in group other than self 0.53 0.55 0.49
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13)
% Men in group other than self 0.63 0.36 0.10
(0.41) (0.58) (0.58)
Info 0.91 0.09 0.76
(0.43) (0.62) (0.54)
Attractive*Info -0.48 -0.42 -0.56
(0.34) (0.46) (0.50)
Middle Attractive*Info -0.38 -0.20 -0.69
(0.24) (0.35) (0.38)
# Attractive people in group other than self*Info -0.66 -0.72 -0.50
(0.16) (0.18) (0.19)
% Men in group other than self * Info 0.62 1.51 1.72
(0.57) (0.79) (0.82)
Individual & Group Random Eﬀects yes yes yes
R2 0.19 0.17 0.22
Note: standard errors in parentheses, and significant values (p-value < 10%) in bold.
observations for the 80 subjects.
35To address unobservable correlation across individuals and across individuals in the same
group, the estimates use a two-way random eﬀects error correction model.
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In the pooled data, the beauty premium holds for attractive and middle at-
tractive people, even when controlling for the beauty and gender composition of
the group. Looking at men and women separately, it is attractive women that gain
the beauty premium, but for men, only middle attractive men earn significantly
more.
Interestingly, even when controlling for individual beauty, both men and women
earn more money when the number of attractive people in the group increases.
The premium to being in the presence of beauty, however, only holds when in-
dividual performance is unknown. Once the group knows what each individual
member contributes, the premium disappears.
Table 10 shows the eﬀects of beauty and gender on average contributions in
each group.36 As with the payoﬀ regressions, these control for individual and
group eﬀects.
Looking at contributions in the pooled regression, we see that average contri-
butions are higher in groups with more attractive people, but only when individual
contributions are not revealed. Once individual contributions are revealed, people
are less cooperative as the number of attractive people in the group increases. As
we saw previously, this change in behavior is driven by men. We also see that
people are more cooperative in groups with more men when contributions are
known, confirming earlier results.
36The dependent variable is the average contribution a subject makes in a group over the 8
rounds he played with that group. Each subject plays with 5 diﬀerent groups, so in total, there
are 400 observations for the 80 subjects.
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Table 10
OLS Regression Coeﬃcients
Dependent Variable: Average Contribution to the Group
Pooled Women Men
(n=400) (n=195) (n=205)
Constant 9.81 8.35 10.05
(1.60) (2.29) (1.89)
Attractive 1.11 0.29 4.01
(1.63) (2.25) (2.47)
Middle Attractive -2.98 -2.06 -4.12
(1.29) (1.92) (1.75)
# Attractive people in group other than self 1.05 1.07 0.65
(0.45) (0.49) (0.56)
% Men in group other than self -2.51 -1.36 -0.73
(1.94) (2.37) (2.35)
Info -2.49 -2.12 -3.20
(2.21) (2.95) (2.92)
Attractive*Info -2.13 -3.35 -2.94
(2.26) (3.19) (3.46)
Middle Attractive*Info 3.48 0.52 5.75
(1.77) (2.54) (2.75)
# Attractive people in group other than self*Info -1.32 -0.47 -1.91
(0.64) (0.70) (0.76)
% Men in group other than self * Info 7.20 7.21 7.17
(2.64) (3.18) (3.28)
Individual & Group Random Eﬀects yes yes yes
R2 0.17 0.18 0.26
Note: standard errors in parentheses, and significant values (p-value < 10%) in bold.
In sum, when controlling for individual beauty and gender and for the beauty
and gender composition of the group, our main results still hold. There is a
premium to beauty, but that premium disappears when performance is known.
Others also benefit from being in the presence of beauty because people are more
cooperative. This monetary return, however, disappear when group members can
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clearly identify individual contributions. People are far less cooperative as the
number of attractive people in the group increases. Being in a group with more
men does increase average contributions, but only when individual contributions
are observed.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
We used laboratory experiments to examine the returns to beauty and gender in
a public goods game. Group members were identified with digital photographs.
In one treatment, group members knew only the total amount contributed to the
public good by the group, while in the other treatment they also knew the exact
contribution of each group member. Subjects’ photos were later independently
rated in terms of physical attractiveness and how helpful-looking the subject ap-
pears.
In general, our results show significant and surprising eﬀects of beauty and
gender on earnings. When performance is unknown, people tend to reward beauty
and females. And, when performance is known, the beauty premium disappears
and the female premium switches to a male premium. These results appear to be
rooted in beauty and sex stereotypes and have three main components.
First, relative beauty is rewarded. Attractive people make more money than
middle attractive people, who in turn make more money than unattractive peo-
ple. This premium to beauty mirrors Hamermesh and Biddle’s (1994) results and
can be quite large. Attractive people earn 15% more than unattractive people.
This premium disappears, however, when actions are known. We find the beauty
premium is not due to the actions of attractive people, but seems to be due to the
expectations of how attractive people will behave, as suggested by psychologists’
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social expectancy theory. People expect beautiful people to be more coopera-
tive, and thus behave more cooperatively toward them when they are in the same
group. But when information on decisions reveals that attractive people are no
more or less cooperative than others, contributions decline relative to groups with
no attractive people. This seems to reflect disappointed stereotypes of attractive
people.
Second, women benefit for being stereotyped as helpful. Women make 7%
more than men when contributions are not known. Looking more closely, we find
the higher payoﬀ enjoyed by women is not due to more selfishness on their part
but, rather, may be a consequence of their beauty and sex stereotypes. Women
are rated significantly higher in attractiveness than men, and their higher payoﬀ
seems to be the reward to their beauty. Also, because women are stereotyped to
be more helpful than men, people are more cooperative in groups of women than
in groups of men when performance is unknown.
Third, when performance is known, the gender premium switches from a fe-
male premium to a male premium. That is, while women gain the benefits of
beauty, men gain the benefits of information. The payoﬀ for men is 15% higher
when performance is known. The payoﬀ for women does not change. Indeed,
this benefit to information for men is comparable in value to the attractiveness
premium for women. Why do men attain this information benefit and women do
not? With information on actions, groups with more men are able to engender
more cooperation from others. That is, they set good examples that are fol-
lowed by others. Free riding declines in groups with more men, and, in apparent
male-competition, men are more likely to contribute their full endowment as the
proportion of men in the group increases.
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There are obvious implications of these results for experimental methodology.
Indeed, this work justifies the extreme measures experimenters take to protect the
identities of subjects. But are there implications of the beauty and gender eﬀects
we found for the real world?
The most striking result from this research is that, on average, men and women
did not behave very diﬀerently, and attractive people did not behave appreciably
diﬀerently than unattractive people. Nonetheless, beauty and gender had signif-
icant eﬀects on earnings. This happened because beauty and gender aﬀect the
way people were treated by others.
Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) found that there is some sorting of beautiful
people into occupations in which employers report that looks may increase pro-
ductivity, such as in sales, but that this is not strong enough to explain much of
the premium to beauty. This leaves social eﬀects rather than productivity eﬀects
as the natural place to look for explanations. Our research suggests one eﬀect of
beauty is rooted in stereotypes. Beautiful people tend to be in more successful
teams because other team members are more cooperative in the presence of beau-
tiful people. This is true when eﬀort is not observable, and suggests that a beauty
premium may be more likely to exist when productivity is not perfectly observed,
implying that beautiful people may also sort into occupations where individual
productivity is diﬃcult to measure. This hypothesis could be examined with labor
market data.
The gender gap can also possibly be explained by a diﬀerent stereotype for
men. While beautiful people benefit from a stereotype of being more cooperative
teammembers, men in our experiment benefit from exceeding the low expectations
others have for them. People seem to expect men to be less helpful than they are.
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When they see men exceeding expectations, they respond by following their lead.
Men may be seen as better leaders despite the expectation that they are more
selfish. In addition, when men are in groups together, they benefit from a kind
of male-competitiveness for contributing to the public good. In the end, men
are more likely to be in successful groups when information on contributions is
known, and the more men in the group the greater the advantage to men. This
again suggests hypotheses that can be tested with labor market data. Professions
where eﬀort can be verified more easily may favor men, and male-dominated
professions may also have a bigger wage gap.
This paper illustrates the possibility for subtle stereotypes to have major eco-
nomic impacts. However, economists are only beginning to consider seriously
causes and consequences of stereotypes. Further work–including theory, policy
and experiments–could fruitfully shed light on this important issue.
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